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Abstract: 
Objective:  To assess the economic burden of infection control measures 
that succeeded in  eradicating multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs) in 
emerging epidemic contexts in hospital settings.  
Design: Systematic literature review  
Methods: Medline, Embase and Ovid databases were systematically 
interrogated for original English language articles detailing costs associated 
with strict measures to eradicate MDROs published between 1st January 
1974 and 2nd November 2014. This study was conducted in accordance 
with the PRISMA guidelines.  
Results: 13 original articles were retrieved reporting data on several 
MDROs including; glycopeptide resistant enterococci (n=5), 
carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriacae (n=1), meticillin resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (n=5) and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter 
baumannii (n=2). Overall, the cost of strict measures to eradicate MDROs 
ranged from €285 to €57,532 per positive patient. The major component of 
these overall costs was related to interruption of new admissions, 
representing from €2,466 to €47,093 per positive patient (69% of the 
overall cost in mean, range: 13 - 100), followed by mean laboratory costs 
of €628 to €5,849 (24%, range: 3.3 - 56.7), staff reinforcement €6,204 to 
€148,381 (22%, range: 3.3 – 52) and contact precautions €166 to 
€10,438 per positive patient (18%, range: 0.7 - 43.3).  
Conclusions: Published data on the economic burden of strict measures to 
Clinical Microbiology and Infection
For Peer Review
eradicate MDRO are limited, heterogeneous, and weakened by several 
methodological flaws. Novel economic studies should be performed to 
assess the financial impact of current policies and identify the most cost-
effective strategies to eradicate emerging MDROs in healthcare facilities.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective:  To assess the economic burden of infection control measures to eradicate 
multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs) in emerging epidemic contexts. 
Design: Systematic literature review 
Methods: Medline, Embase and Ovid databases were systematically interrogated for 
original English language articles detailing costs associated with strict measures to eradicate 
MDROs published between 1
st
 January 1974 and 2
nd
 November 2014. This study was 
conducted in accordance with the PRISMA guidelines. 
Results: 12 original articles were retrieved reporting data on several MDROs including; 
glycopeptide resistant enterococci (n=5), carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriacae (n=1), 
meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (n=4) and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter 
baumannii (n=2). The mean cost of strict measures to eradicate MDROs was €18,519 (range: 
€386 – €57,532) per positive patient. The major component of these overall costs was related 
to interruption of new admissions, representing a mean of €19,384 per positive patient (77%, 
range: 39.9 - 100), followed by mean laboratory costs of €1,280 (22.7%, 3.3 - 47.2), staff 
reinforcement €1,414 (20.9%, 8 – 52.3) and contact precautions €1,752 (18.3%, 0.7 - 53.5). 
Conclusions: Published data on the economic burden of strict measures to eradicate MDRO 
are limited, heterogeneous, and weakened by several methodological flaws. Novel economic 
studies should be performed to assess the financial impact of current policies and identify the 
most cost-effective strategies to eradicate emerging MDROs in healthcare facilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Multi-drug resistant organisms (MDROs) are increasingly prevalent causes of 
healthcare associated infections . Meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), 
extended spectrum beta-lactamase producing Enterobacteriacae (ESBLPE) and 
glycopeptide-resistant enterococci (GRE) have emerged and spread in hospital settings over 
the last several decades. In addition other MDROs including carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) 
represent a more recent threat [1]. 
 
In Europe some countries have focused their efforts on particular MDROs considered 
to be significant threats to public health according to the local epidemiology, implementing 
strict national “search and isolate/destroy” policies [2,3]. These strategies often assume most 
MDRO-positive patients are unknown asymptomatic carriers and standard precautions do 
not reliably halt MDRO transmission in all circumstances [2]. Thus enhanced, or ‘strict’ 
measures are sometimes needed to control the spread and eradicate MDRO at the level of the 
ward, the hospital, and nationally. These strategies range from the enforcement of strict 
contact precautions associated with cross-sectional screening of patients exposed, to a 
rigorous “search and isolate” policy. This latter may include cohorting of MDRO-
positive/contact patients, repeated rectal sampling of contact patients, and both limiting 
transfer of contact patients out of the care unit (bay or ward) and avoidance of new 
admissions until after negative screening tests are available. 
 
These strict recommendations are difficult to implement and require additional human 
and material resources. Moreover interruption of admission into, and transfer from, the 
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involved ward leads to a decrease in hospital medical service utilization and therefore a loss 
of  hospital income and interruption of care to patients [4]. The costs associated with these 
strict measures to eradicate and avoid the spread of emerging MRDOs are not known. This 
systematic review aims to assess the current body of scientific literature regarding the 
financial burden associated with strict control measures to eradicate MDRO outbreaks. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
This study was conducted in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) guidelines [5]. 
 
Search strategy 
A systematic search for original articles in Medline, Embase, and Ovid databases was 
performed. The search covered the period from January 1, 1974 to November 2, 2014. 
Search terms were devised and tailored to each database (Appendix 1) covering (i) infection 
prevention and control, (ii) cost and economic evaluations and (iii) MDRO outbreaks. In 
addition, the reference lists for all selected full-text articles (below) and related reviews were 
scanned to derive any further relevant manuscripts.  
 
Study selection 
Outbreak situations from any type of ward were considered. All studies that 
evaluated the cost and economic burden of strict infection control measures (“search and 
isolate” or “search and destroy” strategies) to eradicate MDROs (including MRSA, 
ESBLPE, CPE, GRE, CRAB) were included. Consideration was given to both descriptive 
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studies with costings, and economic evaluations. Studies that contained no original data and 
those that evaluated interventions to decrease prevalence in an endemic context were 
excluded [6–10]. 
 
Quality criteria 
The Drummond checklist was used to evaluate the quality of economic evaluations 
[11]. For descriptive studies including exclusively costings, the Drummond Checklist was 
modified to 9 items, excluding items required only for economic analyses: 2 items on study 
design, 3 on data collection, 4 on analysis and interpretation of results. For each study 
evaluated, a total methodological score was derived by attributing one point for each item 
present.  
 
Data collection process 
Title and abstract evaluation was undertaken for all papers arising from the literature 
search, with subsequent full text analysis and quality assessment of those studies fulfilling 
the inclusion/exclusion criteria. Two authors (GB and CB) independently reviewed the titles 
and abstracts, and disagreements were resolved by a third person (VV). A data extraction 
form was developed and validated on 10 randomly selected articles. Data from the included 
studies were recorded by two reviewers (GB and CB) then subjected to further critical 
appraisal during a narrative synthesis. In order to compare the costs in different countries 
and at varying points in time, all cost estimates were adjusted for inflation using the 
Consumer Price Index [12] and converted into 2015 Euros. Statistical analyses were 
performed using Epidata 3.1 and Stata
®
 release 10.0 (Stata Corp LP, College Station, TX). 
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RESULTS 
 
Study selection  
Electronic and subsequent manual searches identified 2406 articles, of which 142 
were selected based on title; among these, 127 were excluded based on the abstract, leaving 
15 articles, of which two were irretrievable online (Figure 1). Two further articles were 
identified by manually searching the reference lists. Of these 15 articles, one was in an 
endemic situation, one was unrelated to costs and one did not provide original data, leaving 
12 studies for analysis. The marked heterogeneity in the study objectives and designs 
precluded a meta-analysis.  
 
Study characteristics 
The 12 included studies described outbreaks of GRE (n=5), MRSA (n=4), CPE (n=1) 
and CRAB (n=2) and were conducted in a range of countries from Europe (n=8) and the 
USA (n=2). Most studies were located in a single hospital (11/12; with one study being 
undertaken in three centers), with the number of beds report d in 9/12 studies, varying from 
254 to 2100. The number of wards affected was reported in 10/12 studies and varied from 
one to 22, involving intensive care units (ICUs) in seven studies, medical wards in five 
studies, one surgical ward and one long term care facility (LTCF). Outbreaks lasted from one 
month to eight years. Among the 12 studies, all were descriptive with costings; no study 
reported a formal economic evaluation. The infection control measures implemented and 
costs assessed for each study are described in Figure 2.  
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 The quality criteria for the 12 observational studies are presented in Appendix 2. 
Overall, the mean score was 0.75/2 for study design, 1.33/3 for data collection and 2/4 for 
the analysis and interpretation of results. Finally, the aggregated mean score was 4.1/9.  
 
Laboratory costs 
Ten studies assessed the laboratory costs associated with the screening of 
suspected/contact patients or environmental samples (Figure 2). Cost estimation methods 
were detailed in four studies [13–17]. All studies considered consumables and technician 
time, yet only three included nurse time for obtaining swabs [13–15]. One study 
differentiated costs by negative and positive results [14]. The calculated cost per screening 
culture varied by organism; for GRE from €3.7 to €55.8,[13,18] for CPE €44.2,[19] for 
MRSA from €11.5 to €21.5,[15,17] and for the one study estimating the cost of 
environmental surveillance of CRAB, a cost of €26.1 per surface swabbed was cited [20]. 
Three studies on GRE included molecular typing [13,18,21]. Finally, one study gave an 
overall cost including laboratory, contact precautions, decolonization and staff costs [16]. 
The overall cost from laboratory screening for the MDRO outbreaks varied from 
€3,141 to €7.05 million, with a mean cost of €1,954 (range: €628 – €5,732)  per positive 
patient and €35 (range: €3.7-€122) per screening sample. The laboratory activity represented 
on average 22.5% (range: 3.3 - 56.7) of the overall cost of infection control measures (Table 
2). 
 
Costs of contact precautions 
Nine studies assessed costs related to contact precautions. Five studies detailed the 
elements included in the costing, of which two also included the method of estimation [13–
15,18,22]. Among these five studies, the overall cost included the use of gloves (n=5) and 
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gowns (n=5), procedures of disinfection (n=4), consumable material or material destruction 
(n=2), waste elimination (n=1), alcohol hand rub (n=1) and personal care caddies (n=1). 
Overall, the mean cost was €2,148 (range: €166 - €10,438) per positive patient. Costs or 
contact precautions represented, on average, 15.9% (range: 0.7 - 43.3) of the total cost of 
infection control measures. 
 
Costs associated with additional staff  
Seven studies assessed extra costs from staffing during the MDRO outbreaks. Among 
these costs included: additional nursing personnel for cohorting (n=4) [13,15,19,21], 
laboratory staff/ administrative support and contracting cleaners (n=1) [23], and the absence 
of personnel during MRSA personnel screening and decolonization (n=1) [16]. One study 
reported that the control of a GRE outbreak lasting 40 days required 1663 extra hours of 
nursing staff for 16 positive cases [19]. Overall, the mean additional staff costs was €55,641 
per outbreak (range: €6,204 - €148,381) and €1,414 (range: €477 – €4,086) per positive 
patient when only considering situations with cohorting. On average, the proportion of the 
total cost attributable to additional staffing during MDRO outbreaks was 22.4% (range: 3.3 – 
52). 
 
Costs associated to the decrease in hospital service use 
Eight studies assessed the loss of income for wards due to the implementation of 
infection control measures. Among these, six described costs due to the suspension of 
transfers/admissions [15,18–22]. Three methods were described to determine these costs; (i) 
comparison of activity during the outbreak period to that of the preceding year (n=2) [19,21], 
(ii) multiplication of the number of days beds were unavailable by the average daily activity 
estimated in the concerned unit during another period (n=3) [15,20,22], or (iii) multiplication 
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of the number of admissions lost during the outbreak (or during a comparable period in the 
preceding year) by a cost per admission (n=1) [18].  
The overall mean costs due to ward closure was €446,597 per outbreak (range: 
€38,026 – €1,402,452), equating to €21,497 per positive patient (€884 - €47,093), or €10,509 
per day of outbreak (€422 – €38,670). 
One study estimated the loss of bed occupancy due to contact isolation in single 
rooms to be 93 patients isolated for a total of 2631 days, at a loss per bed-day of between 
€441 and €735 (according to hospital ward type) [24]. Finally, one study evaluated costs 
linked to patient isolation pending screening results for MRSA. This loss was estimated at 
20,424 bed-days with a unit cost of €569 per bed-day equating to a cost of €34,404 per 
positive case and €76 per screened patient [17].  
Costs associated with the loss of hospital activity represented a mean of 76.9% 
(range: 39 - 100) of the overall cost of infection control measures.  
 
Other types of costs 
Four other studies reported additional types of costs: antimicrobials for 
decolonization (n=2),[13,16] installation of electronic taps, dispensers for disinfectants, and 
printing stationary (n=1),[23] and changes to healthcare professional education (n=1) [13].  
 
Overall, the mean cost of strict measures to eradicate MDROs during outbreaks was 
€19,144 (range: €386 – €57,532) per positive patient. After stratification according to the 
type of MDRO, mean costs per positive patient were €9,277 for GRE, €13,995 for MRSA, 
€38,597 for CPE and €44,385 for CRAB. Analysis of cost by ward type demonstrated the 
mean cost per outbreak case to be €23,379 in ICU, €18,957 in mixed ICU and medical ward 
outbreaks, €11,021 for surgical/medical wards and €1,329 in LTCF. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Some European countries are at the gate of a post-antimicrobial era [1]. Strict 
infection control strategies applied by several European countries to control such spread, 
appears to be effective to fight emerging MDROs [1,3]. However these strategies can be 
costly, difficult to implement, and require increased human/laboratory resources and 
occasionally warrant interruption of admissions.  
 
The 12 studies identified in this systematic review were heterogeneous, using 
different methods, settings, and including various types of costs. Analysis of aggregated data 
from across these different contexts, MDROs, wards, hospital, countries using different 
methods therefore offers a more robust range of costs for interventions to terminate MDRO 
outbreaks. From this, potential options to minimize the financial burden associated with 
“search and isolate” strategies can be constructed. Of particular note, the loss of income due 
to the interruption of transfer/admissions represents the main cost of strategies to control 
MDRO spread (mean €21,497 (€884 - €47,093) per positive patient; €11,255 (€422 – 
€38,670) per day of outbreak), whereas mean costs due to additional human resources were 
dramatically lower. These results raise the question of whether dedicated areas for managing 
MDRO outbreak patients might better enable continuity of care for service provision as a 
whole, bringing appreciable cost-savings. The early identification of patients suspected of 
being colonized with an MDRO, combined with rapid implementation of contact 
precautions, is probably the cornerstone of a cost-saving strategy. This may facilitate rapid 
interruption of cross-transmission, thereby avoiding the major categories of expenses 
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observed in this review. In keeping with this strategy, many countries have issued guidelines 
in order to promptly identify, screen, and implement strict contact precautions for patients 
recently hospitalized in a foreign country [2,25].  
 
The estimation of costs related to infection control measures is challenging. The loss 
of income described in studies in this review was frequently assessed by comparing the 
activity of the affected ward during the outbreak to a previous period. This retrospective 
method provides only a crude estimate. The solution, prospective collection of lost patient-
bed days/admissions during an MDRO outbreak, would provide more detailed data but 
would need to be considered in the context of a realistic rate of ward occupancy. The cost 
per bed-day is another important parameter often approximated, frequently through dividing 
total hospital stay cost by the number of patient-days. However, this method does not give 
exact costs at the patient level. All these methods make results deeply dependent on the local 
context (activity, reimbursement system etc.) which limits generalizability.  
 
The unit costs of screening and contact precautions were also highly variable across 
the included studies. Laboratory costs vary according to the type of organism, the technique 
(culture vs PCR), the result (addition of bacterial identification and susceptibility testing for 
positive cultures) and the use of molecular typing. Few studies distinguished between 
consumable costs for strain identification, susceptibility tests and PCR, often giving an 
overall cost for microbiological analysis.  
 
The heterogeneity of costs arising from contact precautions can be explained by the 
variety of included components: the personal protective equipment on the basis of a number 
of visits per patient, cleaning or alcohol hand rub, and other materials needed to implement 
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or facilitate the contact isolation. Some studies described implementing standard precautions, 
while others reported more specific facets of contact precautions. 
 
This review underlines several gaps in understanding the economic impact of MDRO 
outbreaks. First, data were not available from any robust economic evaluations. Explicit 
economic studies in this area are urgently needed, specifically cost-effectiveness analyses to 
establish both the financial and medical impact of interventions to control MDROs. 
Secondly, among the studies included, the methods used demonstrated marked 
heterogeneity, often including a restricted panel of costs. Three types of indirect costs were 
poorly considered: (i) time spent by infection control teams in organizing preventive 
measures, education and participation in meetings; (ii) costs linked to delays in transfer of 
colonized patients to downstream care facilities; and (iii) the impact of contact isolation on 
the quality and safety of patient care. These measures can induce reluctance among 
downstream units  to accept admission of MDRO-positive patients with a mean excess 
length of stay estimated at 23.7-days and a mean cost of €6,381 [26]. Finally, using relative 
rather than crude descriptions of costs might facilitate the interpretation of results and 
comparison of results between outbreaks. 
 
In conclusion, costs associated with strict measures to control MDRO outbreaks are 
highly variable across outbreak organism and location, but in all cases an outbreak-
associated decrease in hospital service use is the major financial driver. Formal economic 
studies must be performed to evaluate current policies and identify optimal strategies to 
eradicate emerging MDROs in healthcare facilities. 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the search strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 studies included for data analysis and synthesis 
 5 describing GRE outbreaks 
 1 describing CPE outbreaks 
 4 describing MRSA outbreaks 
 2 describing CRAB outbreaks 
Literature search 
Databases: PubMed, EMBASE, Ovid,  
Limits: English-language articles only 
2406 publications identified 
Articles screened based on the title 
142 articles identified 
Articles screened based on the abstract 
15 articles assessed in full 
 2 references added 
 
15 manuscripts reviewed and 
assessed for inclusion criteria 
127 studies excluded  
 
Excluded (n=3) 
 1 unrelated to costs or MDRO 
 1 in endemic situation 
1 no original data (review), unrelated 
   
1607 after duplicate removed 
2 full texts irretrievable 
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Abbreviations: MDRO, multidrug resistant organisms; GRE, glycopeptide resistant enterococci; 
CPE, carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriacae; MRSA, meticillin resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus; CRAB, carbapenemase resistant Acinetobacter baumannii 
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Figure 2. Description of infection control measures used and cost estimated in included 
studies. 
References 23 14 25 19 20 22 17 16 18 15 24 21
Infection control measures
Contact precautions
Screening
Environment culture
Cohorting
Ward closure
Cleaning
Decolonisation
Others (training, meetings...)
Costs
Contact precautions
Laboratory cost
Loss of activity
Staff reinforcement 
Opportiny cost
Others (training, meetings...)   
 
Footnote: Descriptors of infection control measures or costs from each study are represented 
by a green box. 
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Table 1. Summary of studies meeting inclusion/exclusion criteria and included in the review with crude costs 
Ref. Outbreak 
duration 
Cases/ 
suspects 
Ward/N Costs 
Laboratory Contact 
Precautions 
Loss of income Staff Others Overa
ll 
Glycopeptide resistant enterococci (GRE) 
23 9 months 169/196
58 
ICU, 
M/23 
Drug, diagnostic 
supplies: €326,707 
PCR equipment: 
€77,178 
Cleaning and 
clothing 
consumables: 
€380,662 
- Cleaners and other 
staff: €693,801 
Nursing, lab and 
administrative staff: 
€704,823 
€520,820 
printing, 
stationary 
and other 
consumables 
€2,703,993 
14 Unclear 5/849 LTCF/1 Swabs, lab 
processing & typing: 
€3,141 
Disposable: €645 
Cleaning: €93 
Reusable gowns: 
€38 
Personal caddie: €55 
- Healthcare aide, 
housekeeping: 
€2,592 
Formal 
education: 
€82 
€6,646 
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25 1 month 48/NR NR - - 2631 days, cost per 
isolation: 
€1,160,108– 
€1,933,513 
- - €1,160,108
– 
€1,933,513 
19 3 months 43 Nephrolog
y, ICU/6 
1543 culture: 
€23,638 
Mol typ: €12,504 
Gloves: €1,815; 
Gowns: €5,361; 
Disinfection: 
€13,874 
37 admissions and 
11 in ICU: €38,026 
- - €97,806 
20 6 weeks 13/294 M/3 Screening, typing: 
€16,408 
Gowns, gloves, 
single use material, 
AHR, disinfection: 
€15,771 
33 admissions lost: 
€120,326 
Overtime + interim: 
€6,204 
Antibiotics: 
€27,275 
€185,984 
Carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) 
22 1 & 2 
months 
16/463 ICU,M,S/
4 & 
716 screening: 
€31,665 
- Admission stopped 
1 to 5 times, 
1663 extra hours: 
€65,385 
- €617,553 
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ICU,M,S/
4 
€520,503 
Meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
17 14 months 25/NR ICU/2 Culturette, lab 
material, 200 
personnel Sc (10 
pos) and 26 Env 
Isolation supplies - Additional staffing 
during personnel 
decolonization 
Decolonisati
on 
€9,644 
16 12 months 257/124
0 
S,M/NR Sc: €320,842 20424 days of 
contact isolation: 
€116,559 
112 days lost: 
€1,402,452 
Extra working 
hours: €148,381 
- €1,988,234 
18 8 years 1230/52
68 
NR/3 
Hosp. 
Pts cult: €2,910,476 
Pts PCR: €351,1967 
Staff cult: €532,251 
Staff PCR: €95,104 
- Isolation costs with 
culture: 
€34,363,277 
With PCR: 
€7,831,397 
Absence cult: 
€3,084,400 
Absence PCR: 
€1,173,579 
- Cult: 
€40,890,40
4 
PCR: 
€12,612,04
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7 
15 10.5 
months 
18/587 NICU/1 Neg cult: €44,234 
Pos cult: €321 
Glove, paper gown, 
mask, 691 Pts day of 
isolation: €33,958-  
€67,905 
- - - €78,514 - 
€110,847 
Carbapenem resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) 
24 1 month 5/NR ICU/1 - Waste elimination & 
cleaning: €13,048 
Drug and non-
cleanable 
destruction: €39,144 
Ward closure: 
€235,467 
- - €287,659 
21 Unclear Episode 
1: 
20/230 
Episode 
SICU/1 Ep1: 230 Sc, €8,474; 
500 Env, €13,052 
Ep2: 34 Sc, €1,252; 
200 Env, €5,221 
Ep1: €5,187 
Ep2: €853 
Ep1: 560 days, 
€586,727 
Ep2: 220 days, 
€222,676 
- - Ep1: 
€613,440 
Ep2: 
€230,002 
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2: 7/34 
 
Abbreviations: Ref, reference; Des, descriptive study; ICU, intensive care unit;  M, medical wards; S, surgical wards; NICU, neonatal intensive 
care unit; SICU, surgical intensive care unit;  LTCF. Long term care facility; NR, not reported; Hosp, hospital; Sc, patient screening; Env, 
environment screening 
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Table 2. Quality analysis of included studies against the Drummond criteria. 
Ref
. 
 Study design  Data collection   Analysis and interpretation of results  
  Research 
question 
stated 
View-point 
of analysis 
clearly 
stated 
Sub-
total/
2  
 Quantities of 
resources 
reported 
separately from 
unit costs 
Methods for 
the estimation 
of both 
quantities and 
prices given 
Currency 
and price 
data are 
recorded 
Sub-
total 
/3  
 Outcomes 
presented 
aggregated and 
disaggreg-ated 
Conclusions 
follow from the 
data reported 
Limit-
ations are 
addressed 
The answer 
to the study 
question is 
given 
Sub-
total 
/4 
Total
/9 
23  No No 0/2  No  No Yes 1/3   Yes No No No 1/4 2/9 
14  Not clear No 0/2  No No Yes 1/3   No No No Not clear 0/4  1/9 
25  No Yes 1/2  No Not clear No 0/3   Yes Yes No No 2/4  3/9 
19  No No 0/2  No No No 0/3   Yes No No Not clear 1/4  1/9 
20  Yes Yes 2/2  No Yes No 1/3   Yes Yes No Yes 3/4  6/9 
22  No Yes 1/2 Yes No Yes 2/3   Yes Yes No No 2/4  5/9 
17  Not clear No 0/2  No No Yes 1/3   Yes Yes No Not clear 2/4  3/9 
16  Yes Yes 2/2  Yes Yes Yes 3/3   Yes Yes No Yes 3/4  8/9 
18  Yes Yes 2/2 Yes Yes No 2/3  Yes Yes No Yes 3/4 7/9 
15  Yes No 1/2   Yes Yes No 2/3   Yes Yes No Yes 3/4 6/9 
24  No No 0/2   No Yes Yes 2/3   No No Yes No 1/4  3/9 
21  Not clear No 0/2  Yes No No 1/3   Yes Yes Yes No 3/4  4/9 
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Table 3. Description of relative costs; per positive patient, per screening, and per day of outbreak.  
 Euros 
Costs per positive patient Costs per screening Costs per day of outbreak 
Proportional 
contribution to 
total costs 
Average 
(median) 
Min - Max 
Average 
(median) 
Min - Max Average (median) Min - Max  
Overall 19144 (13390) 386- 57532 - - 10285 (5522) 23 - 38670 - 
Mean ‘all-organism’ laboratory 
costs 
1954 (1262) 628 - 5732 35 (21.5) 3.7-121.7 866 (646) 164 - 2414 22.5% (3.3-56.7) 
GRE 1280 (1051) 628 - 2390 25.9 (22) 3.7-55.8 754 (401) 364-1495.9 27% (8.8-47.3) 
MRSA 3151 (2475) 1248 - 5732 15.2 (12.7) 11.5-21.5 1151 (891) 148 - 2414 29% (16-57) 
CPE 1979 - 44.2 - 1055 - 5.1% 
CRAB 1400 - 36.8 - 164 - 3.3% 
Contact precautions 2148 (881) 166 - 10438 18.4 (15.3) 1-53.6 605 (323) 35.3 - 1739 15.9% (0.7-43.3) 
Staff reinforcement 2899 (2019) 477 - 8276 34 (15.5) 3.1 - 91.3 1977 (1296) 137 - 5180 22% (3.3 – 51.7) 
Decrease in hospital service use 
21497 (21226) 884 - 47093 733 (251) 24.6 - 3066 11255 (6291) 422 - 38670 76.9% (38.9 – 
100) 
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Appendix 1  
 
Medline search algorithm 
The following search algorithm was developed to search the database using Boolean 
operators and the asterisk symbol (*) as for wildcard truncation:  
Medline search 2 November 2014 GRE: 142 references 
 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Positive Bacterial Infections/economics"[Mesh] OR "Microbiological 
Techniques/economics*"[Mesh] OR "Vancomycin Resistance*"Mesh] OR 
"Enterococcus*"[Mesh]) 
 
Medline search 2 November 2014 CPE: 126 references 
 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections/economics"[Mesh] OR "Carbapenem 
Resistance*"Mesh] OR "Carbapenemase*" OR "Highly drug resistant organisms*" OR 
"OXA*" OR "NDM*" OR "VIM*" OR "KPC*" OR "GES*" OR "IMP*") 
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Medline search 2 November 2014 MRSA: 652 references 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Positive Bacterial Infections/prevention & control*"[Mesh] OR “Gram-Positive 
Bacterial Infections/transmission” [Mesh] OR “MRSA” OR "Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus"[Mesh]) 
 
Medline search 2 November 2014 ESBLPE: 154 references 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections/prevention & control*"[Mesh] OR “Gram-Negative 
Bacterial Infections/transmission” [Mesh] OR “esbl” OR “extended spectrum 
betalactamase”) 
 
Medline search 2 November 2014 CRAB: 175 references 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections/prevention & control*"[Mesh] OR “Gram-Negative 
Bacterial Infections/transmission” [Mesh] OR “Acinetobacter Infections/prevention & 
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control” [Mesh] OR “Acinetobacter baumannii” OR "Acinetobacter baumannii/isolation and 
purification"[Mesh]) 
  
Embase and Ovid search algorithm  
(Cost-Benefit Analysis or Costs or Cost Analysis or Hospital Costs or Models, Economic) 
and (Infection Control or Patient Isolation or Cross infection or Length of stay) and (Gram-
Positive Bacterial Infections or Microbiological Techniques or Vancomycin Resistance or 
Enterococcus or Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections or Carbapenem Resistance or 
Carbapenemase or Highly drug resistant organisms or OXA or NDM or VIM or KPC or 
GES or IMP or esbl OR (extended spectrum betalactamase) or (Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus) or mrsa or (acinetobacter baumannii)) 
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Appendix 2. List of excluded studies and reasons for exclusion 
 
Author Journal Year Category of 
article 
Reason for exclusion 
Wassemberg 
[7] 
Plos one 2010 Major article Endemic situation  
Young [8] Inf Cont Hosp Epidemiol 2007 Major article Not related to costs  
Danchivijitr [9] J Med Assoc Thai. 1995 Major article Irretrievable  
Coast [10] Expert Rev Anti Infect Ther. 2003 Review No original data, not related to 
infection control during outbreak  
Taylor [11] EDTNA ERCA J. 1999 Major article Irretrievable  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective:  To assess the economic burden of infection control measures that succeeded in  
eradicating multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs) in emerging epidemic contexts in 
hospital settings. 
Design: Systematic literature review 
Methods: Medline, Embase and Ovid databases were systematically interrogated for 
original English language articles detailing costs associated with strict measures to eradicate 
MDROs published between 1st January 1974 and 2nd November 2014. This study was 
conducted in accordance with the PRISMA guidelines. 
Results: 13 original articles were retrieved reporting data on several MDROs including; 
glycopeptide resistant enterococci (n=5), carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriacae (n=1), 
meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (n=5) and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter 
baumannii (n=2). Overall, the cost of strict measures to eradicate MDROs ranged from €285 
to €57,532 per positive patient. The major component of these overall costs was related to 
interruption of new admissions, representing from €2,466 to €47,093 per positive patient 
(69% of the overall cost in mean, range: 13 - 100), followed by mean laboratory costs of 
€628 to €5,849 (24%, range: 3.3 - 56.7), staff reinforcement €6,204 to €148,381 (22%, 
range: 3.3 – 52) and contact precautions €166 to €10,438 per positive patient (18%, range: 
0.7 - 43.3). 
Conclusions: Published data on the economic burden of strict measures to eradicate MDRO 
are limited, heterogeneous, and weakened by several methodological flaws. Novel economic 
studies should be performed to assess the financial impact of current policies and identify the 
most cost-effective strategies to eradicate emerging MDROs in healthcare facilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Multi-drug resistant organisms (MDROs) are increasingly prevalent causes of 
healthcare associated infections. Meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), 
extended spectrum beta-lactamase producing Enterobacteriacae (ESBLPE) and 
glycopeptide-resistant enterococci (GRE) have emerged and spread in hospital settings over 
the last several decades. In addition other MDROs including carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) 
represent a more recent threat [1]. 
 
In Europe some countries have focused their efforts on particular MDROs considered 
to be significant threats to public health according to the local epidemiology, implementing 
strict national “search and isolate/destroy” policies [2,3]. These strategies have demonstrated 
their efficiency in preventing the spread of transmissible organisms, eradicate them from 
hospital settings and avoid the endemic situation [4]. These strategies often assume most 
MDRO-positive patients are unknown asymptomatic carriers and standard precautions do 
not reliably halt MDRO transmission in all circumstances [2]. Thus enhanced, or ‘strict’ 
measures are sometimes needed to control the spread and eradicate MDRO at the level of the 
ward, the hospital, and nationally. These strategies range from the enforcement of strict 
contact precautions associated with cross-sectional screening of patients exposed, to a 
rigorous “search and isolate” policy. This latter may include cohorting of MDRO-
positive/contact patients, repeated rectal sampling of contact patients, and both limiting 
transfer of contact patients out of the care unit (bay or ward) and avoidance of new 
admissions until after negative screening tests are available. 
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These strict recommendations are difficult to implement and require additional human 
and material resources. Moreover interruption of admission into, and transfer from, the 
involved ward leads to a decrease in hospital medical service utilization and therefore a loss 
of  hospital income and interruption of care to patients [5]. The costs associated with these 
strict measures to eradicate and avoid the spread of emerging MRDOs are not known. This 
systematic review aims to assess the current body of scientific literature regarding the 
financial burden associated with strict control measures that succeeded in eradicating MDRO 
outbreaks and prevented progression to endemic situations. 
 
METHODS 
 
This study was conducted in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) guidelines [6]. 
 
Search strategy 
A systematic search for original articles in Medline, Embase, and Ovid databases was 
performed. The search covered the period from January 1, 1974 to November 2, 2014. 
Search terms were devised and tailored to each database (Appendix 1) covering (i) infection 
prevention and control, (ii) cost and economic evaluations and (iii) MDRO outbreaks. In 
addition, the reference lists for all selected full-text articles (below) and related reviews were 
scanned to derive any further relevant manuscripts.  
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Study selection 
Emerging outbreak situations from any type of ward were considered. An emerging 
outbreak was defined as the identification of several cases (at least 2) of a same MDRO with 
the same resistance pattern in a same period of time and area, in hospitals never affected 
before. Studies could include several epidemic episodes. All studies that evaluated the cost 
or economic burden of strict infection control measures (“search and isolate” or “search and 
destroy” strategies) to eradicate MDROs (including MRSA, ESBLPE, CPE, GRE, CRAB) 
were included. Consideration was given to both descriptive studies with costings, and 
economic evaluations. Studies that contained no original data and those that evaluated 
interventions to decrease prevalence in an endemic context were excluded [7–11]. 
 
Quality criteria 
The Drummond checklist was used to evaluate the quality of economic evaluations 
[12]. For descriptive studies including exclusively costings, the Drummond Checklist was 
modified to 9 items, excluding items required only for economic analyses: 2 items on study 
design, 3 on data collection, 4 on analysis and interpretation of results. For each study 
evaluated, a total methodological score was derived by attributing one point for each item 
present.  
 
Data collection process 
Title and abstract evaluation was undertaken for all papers arising from the literature 
search, with subsequent full text analysis and quality assessment of those studies fulfilling 
the inclusion/exclusion criteria. Two authors (GB and CB) independently reviewed the titles 
and abstracts, and disagreements were resolved by a third person (VV). A data extraction 
form was developed and validated on 10 randomly selected articles. Data from the included 
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studies were recorded by two reviewers (GB and CB) then subjected to further critical 
appraisal during a narrative synthesis. In order to compare the costs in different countries 
and at varying points in time, all cost estimates were adjusted for inflation using the 
Consumer Price Index [13] and converted into 2015 Euros.  
We aimed to extract the costs of the intervention, this include the total sum of all 
costs, but also the individual components including for personnel (nursing, physician, 
laboratory and infection control staff), materials (laboratory, contact precaution supplies, 
antibiotics etc…) and the loss of income attributable to the implementation of the strategy. In 
addition, where possible, we extracted data on the components of the infection control 
intervention. 
Costs were expressed per positive case and the proportional contribution of 
laboratory, contact precautions, staff and activity components to the total cost calculated for 
each study and in mean for all studies. Since cost values were not normally distributed and 
highly heterogeneous, no formal meta-analysis was performed. We summaries the results 
with ranges (minimum – maximum). Studies were excluded from the analysis when cost 
values were aggregated or insufficiently detailed.  
Statistical analyses were performed using Epidata 3.1 and Stata® release 10.0 (Stata 
Corp LP, College Station, TX). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Study selection  
Electronic and subsequent manual searches identified 2406 articles, of which 400 
were selected based on title; among these, 364 were excluded based on the abstract, leaving 
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36 articles, of which two were irretrievable online (Figure 1). Two further articles were 
identified by manually searching the reference lists. Of these 36 articles, four were in an 
endemic situation, five were unrelated to costs, 13 did not provide original data and one was 
unable to be interpreted leaving 13 studies for analysis [14–26].  
 
Study characteristics 
The 13 included studies described outbreaks of GRE (n=5), MRSA (n=5), CPE (n=1) 
and CRAB (n=2) and were conducted in a range of countries from Europe (n=8) and the 
USA (n=3). All studies were located in a single hospital, with the number of beds reported in 
12/13 studies, varying from 254 to 2100. The number of wards affected was reported in 
11/13 studies and varied from one to 22, involving intensive care units (ICUs) in eight 
studies, medical wards in six studies, two surgical wards and one long term care facility 
(LTCF). Outbreaks lasted from one to 43 months. Among the 13 studies, 12 were descriptive 
with costings and one reported a formal economic evaluation. The infection control 
measures implemented and costs assessed for each study are described in Figure 2.  
 The quality criteria for the 13 studies are presented in Appendix 2. For descriptive 
studies, the mean score was 0.7/2 for study design, 1.2/3 for data collection and 2/4 for the 
analysis and interpretation of results. Finally, the aggregated mean score was 3.9/9. The cost-
effectiveness study obtained a score of 24 after analysis of the full 35 Drummond checklist 
items. 
 
Laboratory costs 
Twelve studies assessed the laboratory costs associated with the screening of 
suspected/contact patients or environmental samples (Figure 2). Cost estimation methods 
were detailed in four studies [15,20–22]. All studies considered consumables and technician 
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time, yet only three included nurse time for obtaining swabs [15,21,22]. One study 
differentiated costs by negative and positive results [22]. The calculated cost per screening 
culture varied by organism; for GRE from €3.7 to €55.8,[15,17] for CPE €44.2,[19] for 
MRSA from €11.5 to €21,[21,23] and for the one study estimating the cost of environmental 
surveillance of CRAB, a cost of €26.1 per surface swabbed was cited [26]. Three studies on 
GRE included molecular typing [15,17,18]. Finally, one study gave an overall cost including 
laboratory, contact precautions, decolonization and staff costs [20]. 
The Table 3 describes results of relative costs per positive patient and proportional 
contribution to total taken by the four main categories of cost excluding two studies [20,24] 
with aggregated and undetailed data. The overall cost from laboratory screening for the 
MDRO outbreaks varied from €3,141 to €684,362 per outbreak, with a cost per positive 
patient ranging from €628 to €5,849 and €3.7 to €122 per screening sample. The laboratory 
activity represented on average 24% (range: 3.3 - 56.7) of the overall cost of infection 
control measures. 
 
Costs of contact precautions 
Eleven studies assessed costs related to contact precautions. Six studies detailed the 
elements included in the costing, of which two also included the method of estimation 
[15,17,21,22,24,25]. Among these six studies, the overall cost included the use of gloves 
(n=6) and gowns (n=6), procedures of disinfection (n=4), consumable material or material 
destruction (n=2), waste elimination (n=1), alcohol hand rub (n=1) and personal care caddies 
(n=1), laundering for reusable material (n=1). Overall, cost ranged from €166 to €10,438 per 
positive patient. Costs or contact precautions represented, on average, 18% (range: 0.7 - 43) 
of the total cost of infection control measures. 
 
Page 42 of 71Clinical Microbiology and Infection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10 
 
 
 
Costs associated with additional staff  
Seven studies assessed extra costs from staffing during the MDRO outbreaks. Among 
these costs included: additional nursing personnel for cohorting (n=4) [15,18,19,21], 
laboratory staff/ administrative support and contracting cleaners (n=1) [14], additional 
infection control staff [23] and the absence of personnel during MRSA personnel screening 
and decolonization (n=1) [20]. One study reported that the control of a GRE outbreak lasting 
40 days required 1663 extra hours of nursing staff for 16 positive cases [19]. Overall, the 
additional staff costs ranged from €6,204 to €148,381 per outbreak and from €477 – €4,086 
per positive patient when only considering situations with cohorting. On average, the 
proportion of the total cost attributable to additional staffing during MDRO outbreaks was 
22.4% (range: 3.3 – 52). 
 
Costs associated to the decrease in hospital service use 
Eight studies assessed the loss of income for wards due to the implementation of 
infection control measures. Among these, six described methods to assess costs due to the 
suspension of transfers/admissions [17–19,21,25,26]. Three methods were described to 
determine these costs; (i) comparison of activity during the outbreak period to that of the 
preceding year (n=2) [18,19], (ii) multiplication of the number of days beds were unavailable 
by the average daily activity estimated in the concerned unit during another period (n=3) 
[21,25,26], or (iii) multiplication of the number of admissions lost during the outbreak (or 
during a comparable period in the preceding year) by a cost per admission (n=1) [17].  
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The overall costs due to ward closure ranged from €38,026 to €1,402,452 per 
outbreak, equating from €2,466 to €47,093 per positive patient, or from €481 to €17,350 per 
day of outbreak. 
One study estimated the loss of bed occupancy due to contact isolation in single 
rooms to be 93 patients isolated for a total of 2631 days, at a loss per bed-day of between 
€441 and €735 (according to hospital ward type) [16]. Costs associated with the loss of 
hospital activity represented a mean of 68.6% (range: 13 - 100) of the overall cost of 
infection control measures.  
 
Other types of costs 
Four other studies reported additional types of costs: antimicrobials for 
decolonization (n=2) or treatment (n=1),[15,20,23] installation of electronic taps, dispensers 
for disinfectants, and printing stationary (n=1),[14] and changes to healthcare professional 
education (n=1) [15].  
 
Analysis by subgroups was performed to avoid the large heterogeneity of results 
obtained in the overall population.  Analysis of the cost by ward type demonstrated the cost 
per positive patient varied from: €4,352 to €57,532 in ICU, €2,275 to 38,597in mixed ICU 
and medical ward outbreaks, €7,736 to 19,387 for surgical/medical wards and €1,329 in 
LTCF. After stratification for those studies which employed the same five strategies (contact 
isolation, screening, cohorting patients, cohorting staff, and ward closure; adopted in five 
studies) the cost per positive patient ranged from €14,306 to €57,532. In ICU, the cost of 
adopting these five strategies ranged from€42,172 to €57,532 per positive patient, and from 
€14,306 to €38,597 in medical/surgical wards. The proportional contribution to total costs 
from each contributory category did not significantly differ between subpopulations. 
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The cost-effectiveness study concluded that an aggressive strategy of search and 
isolate, demonstrated cost saving where the number of new cases exceeded four per month, 
and if the strategy was followed for more than 24 months [23]. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Some European countries are at the gate of a post-antimicrobial era [1]. Strict 
infection control strategies applied by several European countries to control such spread, 
appears to be effective to fight emerging MDROs [1,3]. However these strategies can be 
costly, difficult to implement, and require increased human/laboratory resources and 
occasionally warrant interruption of admissions.  
 
The 13 studies identified in this systematic review were heterogeneous, using 
different methods, settings, and including various types of costs. Analysis of aggregated data 
from across these different contexts, MDROs, wards, hospital, countries using different 
methods therefore offers a more robust range of costs for interventions to terminate MDRO 
outbreaks. From this, potential options to minimize the financial burden associated with 
“search and isolate” strategies can be constructed. Of particular note, the loss of income due 
to the interruption of transfer/admissions represents the main cost of strategies to control 
MDRO spread (from €38,026 to €1,402,452 per outbreak, €2,466 to €47,093 per positive 
patient, and €481 to €17,350 per day of outbreak), whereas mean costs due to additional 
human resources were dramatically lower. These results raise the question of whether 
dedicated areas for managing MDRO outbreak patients might better enable continuity of 
care for service provision as a whole, bringing appreciable cost-savings. The early 
identification of patients suspected of being colonized with an MDRO, combined with rapid 
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implementation of contact precautions, is probably the cornerstone of a cost-saving strategy. 
This may facilitate rapid interruption of cross-transmission, thereby avoiding the major 
categories of expenses observed in this review. In keeping with this strategy, many countries 
have issued guidelines in order to promptly identify, screen, and implement strict contact 
precautions for patients recently hospitalized in a foreign country [2,27].  
 
The estimation of costs related to infection control measures is challenging. The loss 
of income described in studies in this review was frequently assessed by comparing the 
activity of the affected ward during the outbreak to a previous period. This retrospective 
method provides only a crude estimate. The solution, prospective collection of lost patient-
bed days/admissions during an MDRO outbreak, would provide more detailed data but 
would need to be considered in the context of a realistic rate of ward occupancy. The cost 
per bed-day is another important paramete  often approximated, frequently through dividing 
total hospital stay cost by the number of patient-days. However, this method does not give 
exact costs at the patient level. All these methods make results deeply dependent on the local 
context (activity, reimbursement system etc.) which limits generalizability.  
 
The unit costs of screening and contact precautions were also highly variable across 
the included studies. Laboratory costs vary according to the type of organism, the technique 
(culture vs PCR), the result (addition of bacterial identification and susceptibility testing for 
positive cultures) and the use of molecular typing. Few studies distinguished between 
consumable costs for strain identification, susceptibility tests and PCR, often giving an 
overall cost for microbiological analysis.  
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The heterogeneity of costs arising from contact precautions can be explained by the 
variety of included components: the personal protective equipment on the basis of a number 
of visits per patient, cleaning or alcohol hand rub, and other materials needed to implement 
or facilitate the contact isolation. Some studies described implementing standard precautions, 
while others reported more specific facets of contact precautions. 
 
A previous study reviewed economic studies of strategies to control the spread of 
endemic MRSA in hospital settings [28]. This article concluded in a large economic benefit 
(savings seven times higher than costs particularly in long-term strategies) with infection 
control measures to prevent MRSA transmission in low or high endemicity hospitals. The 
findings from our systemic review compliment those of Farbman et al, with our data now 
providing the costs of strategies in emerging outbreak situations, and includes data on 
including various types of MDROs.  
 
This review underlines several gaps in our understanding of the economic impact of 
MDRO outbreaks. First, only one study provided a full economic evaluation of a long term 
strategy of search and isolate. More explicit economic studies in this area are urgently 
needed, specifically cost-effectiveness analyses to establish both the financial and medical 
impact of interventions to control MDROs. Several countries have implemented national 
aggressive strategies to control the spread of GRE, CPE or CRAB. Facing expensive 
measures, the recurrent question of the financial impact of such strategies is asked. A cost-
effectiveness analysis comparing different strategies of infection control based on decision 
analytical modelling with an effectiveness represented by the number of MDRO colonization 
of infection (robust in term of diagnosis) averted and the prevention of resistance extension 
by the increased use of broad spectrum antibiotics. As the antimicrobial resistance is a global 
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issue with interconnection between hospitals, the modelling can only be view at the global 
scale. However, the economic burden at the hospital level would also be useful for a better 
understanding and appropriation of results. 
Second, among the studies included, the methods used demonstrated marked 
heterogeneity, often including a restricted panel of costs. Some studies described 
multifaceted approaches with macro-costing and cumulative costs complicating the synthesis 
of results. This large heterogeneity precluded a meta-analysis. Our subgroup analysis limited 
to just those studies who adopted a uniform approach to their infection control strategy did 
however help to clarify the interpretation of results. Third, three types of indirect costs were 
poorly considered: (i) time spent by infection control teams in organizing preventive 
measures, education and participation in meetings; (ii) costs linked to delays in transfer of 
colonized patients to downstream care facilities; and (iii) the impact of contact isolation on 
the quality and safety of patient care. These measures can induce reluctance among 
downstream units  to accept admission of MDRO-positive patients with a mean excess 
length of stay estimated at 23.7-days and a mean cost of €6,381 [29]. Finally, using relative 
rather than crude descriptions of costs might facilitate the interpretation of results and 
comparison of results between outbreaks. 
 
In conclusion, costs associated with strict measures to control MDRO outbreaks are 
highly variable across outbreak organism and location, but in all cases an outbreak-
associated decrease in hospital service use is the major financial driver. Formal economic 
studies must be performed to evaluate current policies and identify optimal strategies to 
eradicate emerging MDROs in healthcare facilities. 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the search strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 studies included for data analysis and synthesis 
 5 describing GRE outbreaks 
 1 describing CPE outbreaks 
 5 describing MRSA outbreaks 
 2 describing CRAB outbreaks 
Literature search 
Databases: PubMed, EMBASE, Ovid,  
Limits: English-language articles only 
2406 publications identified 
Articles screened based on the title 
400 articles identified 
Articles screened based on the abstract 
36 articles assessed in full 
 2 references added 
 
36 manuscripts reviewed and 
assessed for inclusion criteria 
364 studies excluded  
 
Excluded (n=23) 
 5 unrelated to costs or MDRO 
 4 in endemic situation 
13 no original data (review), unrelated 
1 Uninterpretable results (costs not labelled) 
   
1607 after duplicate removed 
2 full texts irretrievable 
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Abbreviations: MDRO, multidrug resistant organisms; GRE, glycopeptide resistant enterococci; 
CPE, carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriacae; MRSA, meticillin resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus; CRAB, carbapenemase resistant Acinetobacter baumannii 
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Figure 2. Description of infection control measures used and cost estimated in included 
studies. Categories of costs given aggregated in study results were represented by boxes 
filled with a same colour. (e.g. all costs were given aggregated in the reference 20) 
 
References 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
IC measures
Contact precautions
Screening patients
Screening personnels
Environment culture
Cohorting patients
Cohorting staff
Ward closure
Cleaning
Decolonisation
Others
Costs
Personnal protective equipment
Screening materials
Loss of activity 
Clinical staff reinforcement
Opportiny cost
Drug for treatment or decolonisation
Building works
Printing stationary & consumables
Formal education
Lab, administrative or infection control staff
 
 Footnote: Descriptors of infection control measures or costs from each study are represented 
by a green box. 
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Table 1. Summary of studies meeting inclusion/exclusion criteria and included in the review with crude costs 
Ref. Outbreak 
duration 
Cases/ 
Suspected 
cases 
a
 
Type/Num
ber of 
Wards 
affected 
Costs 
Laboratory Personnal protective 
equipment and 
cleaning 
Loss of income due 
to ward closure 
Clinical and non-
clinical Staff 
Others Overall 
Glycopeptide resistant enterococci (GRE) 
14 9 months 169/19658 ICU, M 
(n=23 
wards) 
Screening & drug use: 
€326,707 
b
 
PCR equipment: 
€77,178 
Cleaning and clothing 
consumables: 
€380,662 
b
 
- Cleaners: €693,801 
Nursing, lab and 
administrative staff: 
€704,823  
Printing, 
stationary and 
other 
consumables: 
€520,820 
€2,703,993 
15 Unclear 5/849 LTCF (n=1 
wards) 
Screening & typing: 
€3,141 
Clothing consumables: 
€645 
Cleaning: €93 
Reusable gowns: €38 
Personal caddie: €55 
- Assistant nurses & 
Cleaners: €2,592  
Formal 
education: €82 
€6,646 
16 1 month 48/NR NR - - Cost for 2631 days - - €1,160,108– 
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of isolation: 
€1,160,108– 
€1,933,513 
€1,933,513 
17 3 months 43/NR M, ICU 
(n=6 
wards) 
Screening (n=1543): 
€23,638 
Typing: €12,504 
Gloves: €1,815; 
Gowns: €5,361; 
Cleaning: €13,874 
Loss of 37 
admissions in 
nephrology and 11 in 
ICU: €38,026 
- - €97,806 
18 6 weeks 13/294 M (n=3 
wards) 
Screening & typing: 
€16,408 
Gowns, gloves, single 
use material, AHR, 
disinfection: €15,771 
33 admissions lost: 
€120,326 
Nursing staff: €6,204 Antibiotics: 
€27,275 
€185,984 
Carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) 
19 Episode 1: 
1 month; 
Episode 2:  
2 months 
Episode 1: 
n=6  
Episode 2: 
n=10 /463 
Episode 1: 
ICU,M,S 
(n=4 
wards) 
Episode 2: 
ICU,M,S 
Screening (n=716 ): 
€31,665 
- Cost for ward 
closure:€520,503 
Cost for 1663 hours of 
nursing staff: €65,385 
- €617,553 
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(n=4 
wards) 
Meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
20 14 months 25/NR ICU (n=2 
wards) 
Screening of personnel 
(n=200) & 26 
Environment samples 
Isolation supplies - Additional staffing 
during personnel 
decolonization 
Drug for 
decolonisation 
€9,644 b 
21 12 months 257/1240 S,M Screening: €320,842 Isolation supplies for 
20424 days: €116,559 
Loss of 112 days of 
hospitalisation due to 
ward closure: 
€1,402,452 
Working hours due to 
MRSA (clinical and 
non-clinical): 
€148,381 
- €1,988,234 
22 10.5 
months 
18/587 NICU (n=1 
wards) 
Negative screening: 
€44,234 
Positive screening: 
€321 
Isolation supplies for 
691 patients days: 
€33,958-  €67,905 
- - - €78,514 - 
€110,847 
23 20 months 117/NR  Screenings (n= 
26148): €684,362 
Isolation supplies for 
2,188 patients days: 
€871,582; & 37 
Closure of 2 surgical 
wards: €288,576 
Recruitment of 1 
infection control 
doctor and 3 nurses: 
- €2,268,309 
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Outpatients visits: 
€5,973 
€417,816 
24 43 months 158 with 3 
clusters of 
10, 10 &12 
cases 
 
ICU/S/M Screenings (n=1528) 
€7,199 
Gloves, masks, gowns 
& laundry 
- Nursing staff Vancomycin 
use 
€45,098 
b,c
  
Carbapenem resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) 
25 1 month 5/NR ICU (n=1 
wards) 
- Cleaning: €13,048 
Destruction of 
supplies: €39,144 
Ward closure: 
€235,467 
- - €287,659 
26 Unclear Episode 1: 
20/230 
Episode 2: 
7/34 
SICU (n=1 
wards) 
Episode 1: screening 
(n=230): €8,474; 
Environment samples 
(n=500): €13,052 
Episode 2: screening 
(n=34): €1,252; 
Isolation supplies: 
Episode 1: €5,187 
Episode 2: €853 
Ward closure: 
Episode 1: 560 days, 
€586,727 
Episode 2: 220 days, 
€222,676 
- - Episode 1: 
€613,440 
Episode 2: 
€230,002 
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Environment samples 
(n=200): €5,221 
 
Abbreviations: Ref, reference; Des, descriptive study; ICU, intensive care unit;  M, medical wards; S, surgical wards; NICU, neonatal intensive 
care unit; SICU, surgical intensive care unit;  LTCF. Long term care facility; NR, not reported; AHR, alcohol hands rub 
 
Legends: 
a 
A suspect case was defined as a patient at risk of carrying the MDRO and screened according to these criteria 
b 
Cumulative data for different types of costs. No detailed costs available in the article 
c 
Costs for 2 epidemic episodes were detailed excluding laboratory costs: the first with €31,180 and the second with €13,917 
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Table 2. Quality analysis of included studies against the Drummond criteria. 
Ref
. 
 Study design  Data collection   Analysis and interpretation of results  
  Research 
question 
stated 
View-point 
of analysis 
clearly 
stated 
Sub-
total/
2  
 Quantities of 
resources 
reported 
separately from 
unit costs 
Methods for 
the estimation 
of both 
quantities and 
prices given 
Currency 
and price 
data are 
recorded 
Sub-
total 
/3  
 Outcomes 
presented 
aggregated and 
disaggreg-ated 
Conclusions 
follow from the 
data reported 
Limit-
ations are 
addressed 
The answer 
to the study 
question is 
given 
Sub-
total 
/4 
Total
/9 
14  No No 0/2  No  No Yes 1/3   Yes No No No 1/4 2/9 
15  Not clear No 0/2  No No Yes 1/3   No No No Not clear 0/4  1/9 
16  No Yes 1/2  No Not clear No 0/3   Yes Yes No No 2/4  3/9 
17  No No 0/2  No No No 0/3   Yes No No Not clear 1/4  1/9 
18  Yes Yes 2/2  No Yes No 1/3   Yes Yes No Yes 3/4  6/9 
19  No Yes 1/2 Yes No Yes 2/3   Yes Yes No No 2/4  5/9 
20  Not clear No 0/2  No No Yes 1/3   Yes Yes No Not clear 2/4  3/9 
21  Yes Yes 2/2  Yes Yes Yes 3/3   Yes Yes No Yes 3/4  8/9 
22  Yes No 1/2   Yes Yes No 2/3   Yes Yes No Yes 3/4 6/9 
23  Yes No 1/2 No Yes No 1/3  Yes Yes Yes Partially 3/4 5/9 
25  No No 0/2   No Yes Yes 2/3   No No Yes No 1/4  3/9 
26  Not clear No 0/2  Yes No No 1/3   Yes Yes Yes No 3/4  4/9 
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The full Drummond checklist was used to assess the cost-effectiveness study which obtain a score of 24/35 [24]. 
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Table 3. Overall and subpopulation description of relative costs per positive patient and proportional contribution to total taken by the 
four main categories of cost.  
 Euros 
Costs per 
positive patient 
Proportional contribution to total costs 
Laboratory costs 
Contact precautions Staff reinforcement Decrease in hospital 
service use  
Min - Max Mean % (Min-Max) 
a
 Mean % (Min-Max) 
a
 Mean % (Min-Max) 
a
 Mean % (Min-Max) 
a
 
Overall (n=11) 
b
 1329- 57532 24 (3.3 – 57) 18 (0.7 – 43) 22 (3.3 – 52) 69 (13
 c
 – 100%) 
Type of wards affected      
ICU (n=3) (R1, 80, 34) 4352 - 57532 30 (3.3 – 57) 21 (0.7 – 43) NA 89 (82 – 96) 
ICU + Medical or Surgical wards (n=3) (5, 
140, 25) 
2275 - 38597 19 (5 – 37) 19 (14 – 24) 31 (11 – 52) 62 (39 – 84) 
Medical/Surgical wards (n=3) (R4, 53, R91) 7736 - 19387 18 (9 – 30) 18 (6-39) 5 (3.3 – 7.5) 49 (13
 c
 - 70) 
LTCF (n=1) (35) 1329 47.3 12 39 NA 
Infection control strategy       
Contact isolation + screening + cohorting 
patients + cohorting staff + ward closure 
(n=5) (R4, 25, R91, 80, 34) 
14306 - 57532 12 (3.3 – 30) 16 (0.7 – 39) 7 (3.3 – 11) 68 (13
c
 – 96)  
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Other strategies (n=6) (35, 137, 53, 5, 140, 
R1) 
1329 - 16000 34 (15 – 57) 20 (6 – 43) 33 (7 – 52) 70 (39 – 100) 
 
a
 Mean of the proportional contribution to total costs for the 11 studies. 
b
 Two studies [20, 24] were excluded from the analysis due to aggregated data and low level of informations on costs estimated. 
c
 The minimal value is an outlier study assessing cost of a long term screening strategy and including three shorter periods of outbreak with the 
implementation of strict measures. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Medline search algorithm 
The following search algorithm was developed to search the database using Boolean 
operators and the asterisk symbol (*) as for wildcard truncation:  
Medline search 2 November 2014 GRE: 142 references 
 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Positive Bacterial Infections/economics"[Mesh] OR "Microbiological 
Techniques/economics*"[Mesh] OR "Vancomycin Resistance*"Mesh] OR 
"Enterococcus*"[Mesh]) 
 
Medline search 2 November 2014 CPE: 126 references 
 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections/economics"[Mesh] OR "Carbapenem 
Resistance*"Mesh] OR "Carbapenemase*" OR "Highly drug resistant organisms*" OR 
"OXA*" OR "NDM*" OR "VIM*" OR "KPC*" OR "GES*" OR "IMP*") 
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Medline search 2 November 2014 MRSA: 652 references 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Positive Bacterial Infections/prevention & control*"[Mesh] OR “Gram-Positive 
Bacterial Infections/transmission” [Mesh] OR “MRSA” OR "Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus"[Mesh]) 
 
Medline search 2 November 2014 ESBLPE: 154 references 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections/prevention & control*"[Mesh] OR “Gram-Negative 
Bacterial Infections/transmission” [Mesh] OR “esbl” OR “extended spectrum 
betalactamase”) 
 
Medline search 2 November 2014 CRAB: 175 references 
("Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Costs and Cost Analysis"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Costs"[Mesh] OR "Models, Economic"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control/economics*"[Mesh] 
OR "Patient Isolation/economics"[Mesh] OR "Cross Infection/economics*"[Mesh] OR 
"Length of Stay/economics"[Mesh] OR "Length of Stay*"[Mesh]) AND  
("Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections/prevention & control*"[Mesh] OR “Gram-Negative 
Bacterial Infections/transmission” [Mesh] OR “Acinetobacter Infections/prevention & 
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control” [Mesh] OR “Acinetobacter baumannii” OR "Acinetobacter baumannii/isolation and 
purification"[Mesh]) 
  
Embase and Ovid search algorithm  
(Cost-Benefit Analysis or Costs or Cost Analysis or Hospital Costs or Models, Economic) 
and (Infection Control or Patient Isolation or Cross infection or Length of stay) and (Gram-
Positive Bacterial Infections or Microbiological Techniques or Vancomycin Resistance or 
Enterococcus or Gram-Negative Bacterial Infections or Carbapenem Resistance or 
Carbapenemase or Highly drug resistant organisms or OXA or NDM or VIM or KPC or 
GES or IMP or esbl OR (extended spectrum betalactamase) or (Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus) or mrsa or (acinetobacter baumannii)) 
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Appendix 2. List of excluded studies and reasons for exclusion 
 
Author Journal Year Category of 
article 
Reason for exclusion 
Wassemberg Plos one 2010 Major article Endemic situation  
Young Inf Cont Hosp Epidemiol 2007 Major article Not related to costs  
Danchivijitr J Med Assoc Thai. 1995 Major article Irretrievable  
Coast Expert Rev Anti Infect Ther. 2003 Review No original data, not related to 
infection control during outbreak  
Taylor EDTNA ERCA J. 1999 Major article Irretrievable  
Gregory Pediatrics 2009 Major article Endemic 
Huttner Antimicrob Resist Infect Control. 2013 Review No original data, not related to 
costs 
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French Adv Drug Deliv Rev. 2005 Review No original data 
Trick J Am Geriatr Soc. 2004 Major article Endemic situation 
Forward Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 1997 Major article Not related to costs 
Lee Clin Microbiol Infect. 2011 Major article Not related to measure to eradicate 
MDROs 
Schultz Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2009 Major article Not related to measure to eradicate 
MDROs 
Lautenbach Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2009 Major article Not related to measure to eradicate 
MDROs 
Khoury Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2005 Major article No costs 
Pike Arch Phys Med Rehabil. 2002 Major article Not related to measure to eradicate 
MDROs 
Cimolai Can J Microbiol. 2010 Review No original data 
Page 70 of 71Clinical Microbiology and Infection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6 
 
Regev-Yochay Emerg Infect Dis. 2005 Major article No costs 
Nixon J Bone Joint Surg Br 2006 Major article Not related to measure to eradicate 
MDROs 
Goetghebeur Can J Infect Dis Med Microbiol 2007 Review No original data 
Raka Braz J Infect Dis. 2009 Major article No costs 
Koeleman J Hosp Infect. 1997 Major article No costs 
Wassenberg Clin Microbiol Infect. 2011 Major article Not related to measure to eradicate 
MDROs 
Millar J Hosp Infect. 2014 Review No original data 
Weddle Am J Infect Control. 2012 Major article Not related to measure to eradicate 
MDROs 
Snyder Journal of Burn Care & Rehab 1993 Major article Uninterpretable data 
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